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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DARFEL.L J. DIDERICKSEN &
SONS, INC., a Corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
MAGNA WATER & SEWER
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT,
Defendant, Third-Party :
Plaintiff and Appellant,:
vs.
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Third-Party Defendant
and Appellant,
and
TEMPLETON, LINKE & ASSOCIATES,
Third-Party Defendant.

Case No.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATE~1ENT

OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

This case involves a construction contract for
the relocation of the Magna Water and Sewer Improvement
District's sewer line adjacent to 2400 South, from 7200
West to approximately 8900 West, Magna, Utah.
Respondent (hereinafter Contractor) claimed
defendant Magna Water and Sewer Improvement District
(hereinafter Magna) breached the contract by failure to
recognize changed conditions and failure to pay progress
payments timely.

Magna counterclaimed for breach of

contract for failure of Contractor to complete the work
and sought recovery of its additional costs.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant Magna named the Utah State Department of
Transportation (hereinafter DOT) and its engineers as~.

l,r;

party defendants.
The trial court granted judgment for Contractor.
Magna and DOT, the party that has the ultimate financial
responsibility, joined in appealing from the judgment.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake ~w
the Honorable Jay E. Banks presiding, awarded Contractor a
judgment against Magna for the sum of $24,969.00, representing the amount earned but unpaid at the time Contractor
ceased operations.

The Court further ruled that Contractor

failed to prove its right to anticipated profits.

The tri'

court held that Magna's failure to approve change orders
and to pay the Contractor's estimates as set forth in the
contract constituted a breach thereof.

Magna and DOT moved

the court for a new trial, and after the matter was argued
before the court on two occasions and memorandums submitted
the court denied their motion.
Due to Contractor's failure to prove its anticipate;
profits, the claims of Magna against the Third-Party Def~
dant Templeton, Linke and Associates were dismissed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Magna seeks a reversal of the judgment in favor ~
Contractor for $24, 969. 00, and in lieu thereof a judgment
in the sum of $71,066.60 on Magna's counterclaim.

- 2 -
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Said amount represents the additional costs incurred by
Magna to complete the sewer relocation project.
In the alternative Magna seeks a new trial with
instructions to the trial court on the proper method of
ascertaining damages.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Contractor entered into a contract with Magna
on September 23, 1975, to relocate Magna's sewer line
along 2400 South, west of 7200 West, to accommodate construction of a new four-lane State highway, which was being
constructed by DOT.
DOT had entered into an agreement with Magna
for the reimbursement of all costs incurred by Magna for
the sewer line relocation project.
Said agreement provided that DOT would reimburse
Magna within 60 days after receipt of itemized bills covering the costs incurred by Magna for performing the work
required under the terms of the agreement.

The contract

between Magna and Contractor stated that Magna would make
progress payments on the 15th day of each month to Contractor provided Contractor submitted its estimate not
later than the 1st day of the month.

The Contractor's

first periodic estimate for partial payment was submitted
after November 7, 1975, in the sum of $22,744.32 (Exh.
3-P, TT., P. 21-22)

Contractor submitted a second peri-

odic estimate for partial payment after December 5, 1975,
-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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in the sum of $54,380.46. (Exh. 4-P, TT, P. 23)

Th2 Con.

tractor submitted its third periodic es t"im2te f or p:irtia]
payment sometime in January of 1976, for po.yTT>ent in the
Slliil

of $18,640.15. (Exh. 5-P, TT, P. 24-25)
On January 27, 1976, Magna paid Contract"lr the

S"!l1
~

of $22,744.32 on Con t ractor ' s f"irst estimate aad on

February 6, 1976, paid the s1.1.i-n of $54, 386. 46 on Contractor
second estimate.

i'.fo further payments have been pclid to

Contractor by Magna.
A pre-construction conference was held on the

~

day of September, 1975, at the offices of Templeton, Linke

& Associates.

At said conference Contractor was advised

that W. W. Clyde Construction Company would cmmnence work
on a new highway along 2400 South in conjunction with the
construction of the sewer line.
Contractor, Magna' s engineers, and representath
of DOT met at 8400 West 2400 South, l1agna, Utah, on September 30, 1975, to discuss the problems that might occur
in constructing the sewer line in that area. (TT, P. 270)
On that date, representatives of DOT and Magna' s engineer':
suggested that Contractor commence construction at 8400
West and proceed west in order to avoid additional expense
to Contractor by reason of having to restore work comp~~
by the highway contractor.(TT. P. 271)
Contractor advised representatives of DOT and
Magna on that date that it would not commence work west of

8400 West without a change order. (TT, P. 37)

Contractor

further advised that it had planned to do \mrk west of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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8400 West in the winter time when the ground was frozen.
(TT,

P.

107)

Contractor failed to determine prior to bidding,
that the pasture areas west of 8400 West do

not freeze

because of the alkalinity or salinity content of the ground.
(TT I

P.

305)

Contractor was advised that a change order was
not necessary and that Contractor could proceed in the
8400 West area without a change order.

Any of the changes

in alignment of the sewer line, or additions and deletions
to the construction plans, would be covered in the unit
price contract that existed between Magna and Contractor.
Consequently, Contractor would have been reimbursed for
any expenses incurred as a result of any such changes.
In order to allow Contractor to commence work
at 8400 West, DOT ordered the highway contractor not to
work in that area so that Contractor could complete his
work prior to the road construction project.
TT.

I

(Exh. 36-D,

P. 231)
Despite the steps taken by Magna and DOT to

avoid conflicts between the sewer project and the highway
project, Contractor commenced construction first on the
east end of the sewer line and, thereafter, the highway
contractor proceeded with road construction near the
west end of the sewer relocation project.
The plans and specifications for the sewer line
required that the line be constructed through the Ritter

-5-
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Canal.

The plans and specifications for construction of

the highway required the temporary relocation of the R"ltter
Canal and construction of a box culvert to accoI'lmodate the
canal.
\J. W. Clyde and Contractor were to coordinate

their work at the Ritter Canal so as to avoid additional
costs to Contractor.

Max Fuller of DOT had arranged a time

when Contractor could construct the sewer line before

w.

H.

Clyde Construction Company constructed the box culvert for
the Ritter Canal, but Contractor failed to install the sewer
line on schedule.

(TT, P. 123)

Contractor constructed the sewer line from 7200
West to a manhole immediately east of the Ritter Canal at
approximately 8200 West.

At that point Contractor refused

to proceed further without a change order.
As a result of Contractor's refusal to complete
the contract, Magna, after public bidding, awarded a contract to Jay Tuft Construction Company (hereinafter Tuft)
for the completion of the sewer line.

Tuft completed the

work for the total sum of $167,443.32.
A major problem as perceived by the Contractor,
augering under the Ritter Canal, was proven to be unnecessar
Tuft merely excavated on both sides of the culvert with a
backhoe and laid the pipe in one day.

(TT, P. 255)

Contractor, in bidding the project, had planned
to divert the flow of the canal and construct a line
through the canal bed, and then redivert the flow over
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the constructed line and proceed from that point.

(TT., P. 327)
Contractor's plan to divert and redivert the Ritter Canal
would have taken three to four days, but as a result of the
box culvert being installed, the contractor would have constructed the sewer line in one day and thus benefited
cially by its error in judgment.

finan-

(TT., P. 328)

ARGID1ENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING TP.AT CONSTRUCTION
COULD NOT BE COMPLETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE CONTRACT BECAUSE OF HIGHWAY CONSTRUCTION
IS ERRONEOUS.
The trial court in its Finding of Fact No. V stated
the following:
"Because of the highway construction,
construction of the sewer relocation project
could not be completed in accordance with the
terms and specifications of the contract
entered into between plaintiff and defendant."
Appellants assert that this finding is not supported
by the record and is clearly in error.

In fact, the sewer

line project was completed by Tuft, substantially in
accordance with the requirements of the original contract.
Further, the agreement between Magna and Contractor
was a unit price contract.

Therefore, Contractor would

have been compensated for additional work performed in
re-routing any portion of the sewer line which might have
conflicted with the highway construction work.
Contractor seeks to excuse its failure to perform
by claiming that the highway construction project prevented
completion of the sewer line under the terms of the conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
tract.
However,
Contractor acted in bad faith by refusing
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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to avail itself of an opportunity to avoid a conflict b
commencing work first in the area west of 8400 l:Jest.
time of the pre-construction con f erence, Contractor was not,.
fied of a possible conflict with a highway project and that
a suspension order had been issued to the highway contracto•
to permit Contractor to complete the sewer line in that are:
first.

Both Magna and DOT recommended to contractor that i:

commence operations first at the 8400 West end of the projec
The evidence indicates that Contractor had notice:
other construction work in progress in that area even prior
the pre-construction conference.

James D. Didericksen t~L

fied that his father informed him three days aftr~r the sewe:
contract was executed that he observed another
cavating in the sewer project area.

contractor~

(TT., P. 35)

The Supreme Court of Utah has held in a recent cas<
that Contractors are generally charged with notice of anyoc
tions which may be less than ideal for construction work,
which reasonably could have been anticipated.
Sons

Construction Company v. County of Tooele,

b1.

In L. A. Your

575 P. 2d

1034 (1978), the court stated:
" . . . (O)ne who has contracted to perform a
particular job for a stated price, if performance
is possible, will not be excus~d from performance
or entitled to extra compensation on account of
encountering difficulties which have not been pro·
vided against in the contract." 575 P.2 at 1037
Magna should not be held to have guaranteed in
the sewer line contract that Contractor would not encounter

-8-
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any difficulties in the construction of the line.

The

accepted rule of law applicable herein is that performance
is

not excused by mere inconvenience, unpleasantness,

or unfor2seen hardship or difficulties.
The Supreme Court of Utah in Lowe v. Rosen~of,
12 U.2d 190, 364 P.2d 418 (1961), held that a contractor,
in order to recover under its contract, must establish
its own performance or a valid excuse for its failure to
perform.
The only excuse alleged by Contractor for its
failure to complete the line resulted from Contractor's
own errors of judgment in evaluating the project.
Contractor claimed it could not colllI!lence construction at the 8400 West end prior to the highway crew
because it had planned to work there in the winter when
the marshy ground in the area would be frozen and would
support the weight of its excavating equipment.
Magna presented evidence at trial to the effect
that the alkalinity and salinity of the soil in the marshy
area in question prevented its freezing solidly even
during severe winters.
Further, Tuft completed the work in that area
with little difficulty despite the softness of the ground.
It must be noted the contract in question was
between contractor and Magna, and that Magna did nothing
to hinder performance by Contractor.

The acts complained

of and which Contractor alleges created a change of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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conditions were the acts of an independent highway
contractor and not those of Magna nor DOT.
POINT II
APPELLANT MAGNA'S FAILURE TO MAKE
PROGRESS PAYMENTS STRICTLY WITHIN
THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT DID NOT
CONSTITUTE A BREACH AND RESPONDENT
CONTRACTOR SHOULD BE ESTOPPED FROM
CLAIMING A BREACH DUE TO ITS OWN
ACTIONS.
The trial court ruled that Magna's failure to
make progress payments within the time limits of the
contract was a breach which justified Contractor in
terminating work on the project.
The court, by so ruling, imposed a double
standard.

It held Magna to a different standard than that

imposed on the Contractor in that Contractor failed to submi·
its payment estimates in a timely manner, yet Magna was
required to make payment strictly within the times
established in the contract.
A.

MAGNA DID NOT BREACH ITS
CONTRACT WITH CONTRACTOR BY
FAILING TO MAKE PROGRESS PAYMENTS ON NOVEMBER 15 AND ON
DECEMBER 15, 1975

James Didericksen testified for Contractor that
none of its three estimates were submitted to Templeton,
Linke, engineers for Magna, for approval and certification
prior to the first day of the calendar month following the
month in which the work was performed as required by
paragraph 25(a) of the Magna-Didericksen contract.
(TT. , P. 120 )

Mr. Didericksen testified that he was to~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by Robert Emerson of Templeton, Linke that he would receive
p0ym2nt by the 15th of such calendar month if the estim~tes
were submitted after the 1st of each month but prior to the
date on which Magna's Board held its regular monthly meeting.
Further, Didericksen testified that Emerson was of the
opinion that such meetings occurred on approximately the
12th day of the month.

(TT. pp. 20-21)

However, Didericksen testifed that during the
first part of November, 1975 he first learned that DOT was
making all payments and that the State's processing of the
estimates would not be completed by the 15th of the month.
(TT. pp.24-25)

Contractor continued working during the

remainder of November and December,

197~

with full know-

ledge of the actual manner in which progress payments
would be made and that such payments could not be processed
by the 15th of the month.

Contractor also submitted two

estimates after being so informed.

Contractor accepted

progress payments in January and February, 197~ without
any reservation of its rights concerning the timeliness of
the payments.
B.

CONTRACTOR WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO
RECEIVE PROGRESS PAYMENTS BY
THE lSTH DAY OF THE CALENDAR
MONTH FOLLOWING THE MONTH FOR
WHICH WORK HAD BEEN PERFORMED,

contractor waived its right to receive progress
payments strictly within the time limits established in
the contract.

A waiver has been defined as the 1'intentional

.
· h men t of a known right" and may be either express
re 1 inquis
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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or implieC..
61 P.2d 308, 311-312 (1936).

See also, Bjork__y. April

Industries, Inc., 547 P.2d 219 (1976).
Based on the testiwony of James Didericksen,
Contractor clearly waived any right to be paid by the 15th
of the calendar month following the month in which it performed work by continuing to work on the project, submittfo;
additional estimates for work performed on the project,
and accepting partial· payment for such work after learning
during the first part of November, 1975 that progress payments would be paid in a different manner than set forth in
the written contract.
C.

CONTRACTOR IS ESTOPPED FROM
ING THAT MAGNA BREACHED ITS
BY FAILING TO MAKE PROGRESS
TO PLAINTIFF BY NOVEMBER 15
DECEMBER 15, 1975.

ASSERTCONTRACT
PAYMENTS
AND

In J. P. Koch v. J. C. Penney Company, Inc.,

534 P.2d 903 (1975), the Supreme Court of Utah defined
estoppel as:
" • • . (A) doctrine of equity to
prevent one party from deluding or
inducing another into a position
where he will unjustly suffer loss
.
.The test is whether there
was conduct, by act or omission,
by which one party knowingly ~eads
another party, reasonably acting
thereon, to take some course of
action which will result in his
detrim~nt or damage if the first
party is permitted to repudiate.or
deny his conduct or representation.
534 P.2d at 904-905

11
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The doctrine of estoppel is applied independently
of any contract or agreement between the parties, and
thus, there is no requirement of consideration.

In Larsen

v. Knight, 120 U. 261, 233 P.2d 365, 372 (1951), the
Supreme Court of Utah stated that a "par1y claiming a right
ought not to appear to acquiesce in nonperformance by the
other party until the time has gone by for such performance
and then claim damages."
In this case, Contractor continued performance of
the contract for a period of approximately 45 days after
learning that progress payments would not be made by the
15th day of the month following the month for which work
was performed.

By reason of Contractor's conduct and

acquiescence, Magna was induced to believe that progress
payments could be made at a date later than that called for
by the written contract without constituting a breach
thereof.

Contractor, having engaged in such conduct and

having accepted two of the progress payments at dates
later than that specified in the written contract, ought
not to be permitted to claim that Magna breached the
agreement by making the payments when it did.
In the case of Wagstaff v. Remco, Inc., 540 P.2d
931 (1975), the Supreme Court of Utah stated concerning
delayed payments:
" • • • (A) a mere delay of a month
by a party in making a payment on a
contract will usually result in
damages only and will not justify
the other parx in abandoning the
contract . . . 540 P.2d at 933
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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In \.J~s raff, supra, the court held that a
contractor must complete construction unless the del'ty
in payrnent affects its ability to continue uerforminu
..

under the contract.

,_J

In the instant case, Contractor

clearly had the ability to continue Performance in view
of the fact that it continued progress on the constructioo
of the sewer line for some 45 days after learnin8 of the
delay in progress payments.
Contractor evinced no serious concern oveT

dela~

in payment and made no objection Hhen informed by Hagna
that payments would have to originate with DOT.

In fact,

this issue was not raised until after Contractor terminated
operations, apparently as an afterthought, to justify termi·
nating performance under the contract.

POINT III
RESPONDENT CONTRACTOR, AFTER ALLEGEDLY
LEARNING OF VARIOUS OBSTACLES FOR. THE
FIRST TIME, ELECTED TO PROCEED UNDER
TEP.HS OF THE CONTRACT, AND ITS SUBSEQUENT SUSPENSION OF OPERATIONS WAS
A BREACH THEREOF.
Magna and DOT both urged the trial court to find
that Contractor had breached its agreer.lent with Ma8na.

The

trial court rejected the argu.i-nents of the parties and vari·
ous legal authorities in concluding that Contractor was
justified in terminating operations.
Contractor began construction at the east end
·
the fact ,_·t had been informed
of the sewer line d espite

0 West end which would
of the highway project at the 840
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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be suspended to permit Contractor to complete its work
in that area first.
Further, Contractor refused to proceed further
when it reached the Ritter Canal crossing, claiming that a
box culvert installed at that point would necessitate
augering under the culvert at great expense in order to
proceed with the sewer line.

Once again, Contractor's

own error in judgment was claimed as an excuse for breaching the agreement with Magna.

The contractor who completed

the project did so without having to auger at the Ritter
Canal crossing.
The evidence reveals that the alleged changed
conditionsclaimed by Contractor as an excuse for refusing
to complete performance were the product of Contractor's
own errors and omissions and its refusal to cooperate with
the suggestions by Magna and DOT to avoid conflicts with
the highway project.
Appellants submit that the case of Hurwitz~.
David K. Richards Co., 20 U.2d 232, 436 P.2d 749 (1968),
outlines three alternatives for one who claims that another
party to a contract has breached the same.
(1)

to rescind the contract;

(2)

to treat the contract

as binding and wait for performance; or (3)
damages.

They are:

to sue for

Concerning the first alternative, the Supreme

Court of Utah stated in the case of Green v. Palfreyman,
109 U. 291, 166 P.2d 215 (1946):
-15Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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. " Forfei ~ures are not favored, and in
interpreting an agreement, every reasonabl~ presum~tion should be indulged
against an intention to allow a forfeiture." 166 P.2 at 219.
In Jameson v. Wurtz, 396 P.2d 68 (1964), the
Supreme Court of Alaska states:
" . . . (E)quity abhors forfeiture and
will seize upon slight circumstances to
relieve a party therefrom."396 P.2d at
74

The case of Schepf v. McNamara, 354 Mich. 393,
93 N. W. 2d 320 (1958), involved a claim of breach of
contract for hauling sand after the haul distance was
increased.

The Michigan Supreme Court stated:

" By continuing thus to perform and
to accept payments under it, as above
noted, he lost his right, if any, to
terminate the contract and declare it
forfeited.
It was appellant's duty, when it
discovered the apparent breach of the
contract, if it intended to insist upon
a forfeiture, to do so at once. By
permitting appellees to proceed with
the performance of the contract it
waived a breach.
Where there has been a material breach
which does not indicate an intention to
repudiate the remainder of the contract,
the injured party has a genuine election
either of continuing performance or of
ceasing to perform. Any act indicating
an intent to continue will operate as a
conclusive election, not indeed of
depriving him of a right of action for
the breach which has already taken place,
but depriving him of any excuse for
ceasing performance on his own part."
Contractor herein allegedly did not know the
highway contractor would be working in the project area
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at the same time.

However, between the time the Contractor

submitted its bid on

th e 15th o f

octo b er, 1975, Contractor

became aware of the following facts:
(1)

There was ground water in the
pasture area west of 8400 West;

(2)

There would be simultaneous highway
construction in the immediate area
of the project;

(3)

The highway contractor had commenced
work and had begun excavating the
drainage ditch on the western portion
of the project, and Contractor knew
this would result in a restricted
working area;

(4)

A box culvert would be installed at
the Ritter Canal crossing;

(5)

A box culvert would be installed
at 8400 West; and

(6)

There would be a substantial need
for coordination among the various
contractors working on the project.

The Contractor, having knowledge of the facts
above enumerated and believing the same to constitute
grounds for breach of contract, nevertheless elected to
proceed, thus depriving it of any excuse for later ceasing
performance.
the job.

Contractor remained obligated to complete

It would still have had an opportunity to assert

that i t was damaged by reason of the alleged breach at the
conclusion of the contract and could conceivably have
recovered appropriate damages, if any.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S METHOD OF DETERMINING DAMAGES IS CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED
LEGAL PRECEDENT.
-17-
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The trial court ruled that Contractor failed to
prove its claimed anticipated profits.

Further, it

determined that Contractor had earned the sum of $24 ,959.oo
which had not been paid to Contractor by Magna.
do not contest these rulings.

Appellants

Appellants contend,

ho~vever,

that the law of this State is well defined concerning the
issue of damages in construction contract

cases.

recent case of Holman v. Sorensen, 556 P.2d 499

In the

(1976),

the Supreme Court of Utah found the construction site owner
in breach of a construction contract.
citing the earlier case of ICeller v.

opinion,t~~

In its
De~_e_ret

Mortu_".:__£._Z_C~,

23 U.2d 21, 455 P.2d 197 (1969), 3tated:
"It is the undisputed law of this
State and the general consensus of
legal writers that breach of construction contract damages are based upon
the total amount promised for the
project, less the reasonable costs of
completing it." 556 P. 2d at 500
Kelle!:_, supra, contains a formula for the computa·
tion of damages in construction contract
by a

cases approved

unanimous court as follows:
$3,850.00

" Total con tract
Paid by the defendant
Balance if job had been
completed
Less reasonable costs of
completion

- 1,500.00
2,350.00
500.00
11

$1,850.00
455 P. 2d at 198

Plaintiff's damage
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This formula was applied by the court in \'lagstaff
v~emco,

supra.

In that case, the Court, based on disputed

evidence, allowed an offset of $4,099.00 against the balance
claimed by the plaintiff to be due and owing, constituting
the difference between the total contract price and the
amount paid by the owner.

The result was a net judgment

in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $4,064.94.
The court in Wagstaff stated the following:
"Notwithstanding the trial court's
ruling that Remco had been guilty of
breach for failing to make the large
initial payment as set forth above,
it also ruled, (and we do not disagree)
that Remco was entitled to offset
against Wagstaff's contract price, the
amount of expenses reasonable and necessary to complete the job." 540 P.2d
at 933
using the above described formula and substituting
the applicable amounts as derived from the evidence in the
instant case, results in

the following determination :

Total contract price
for sewer relocation

$198,476.50

Less amount paid by Magna
to Contractor

- 77,130.78

Amount available to
complete project

$121,345.72

Maana's cost to complete
project:
Paid to Tuft
Amount earned but
unpaid to Contractor

$167,443.32

Less funds available to
complete project

24,969.00
$192.412.32
- 121,345. 72
71,066.60

Magna's total damages
-19-
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Less off set for amount
earned but unpaid to
Contractor

$ 24,969.00

Magna's net damages

$ 46,097.60

The court ruled that Contractor failed to prove
its damages as far as any anticipated profits.

On the

other side, the cost to Magna of com;:>leting the contract
as well as the additional cost for work completed by the
Contractor was established by the evidence.

The result

is that the trial court should have ruled on the busis of
the evidence before it, which evidence was not

challeng~

by the Contractor, that Magna was entitled to judgwent
against Contractor since the reasonable cost

of co;:ipletinJ

the project exceeded the funds available under the original
contract by an amount of $71,066.60.

Further, Magna was

entitled to retain as an offset against said sum the amount
of $24,969.00 earned by but unpaid to Contractor, leaving
net damages to Magna in the sum of $46,097.60.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, Appellants request
this court to reverse the judgment in favor of Contractor
and grant judgment in favor of Magna, or in the alternative,
to reverse and remand the case for a new trial with
instructions as to the correct method of computing damages.
DATED

this~;!~~y

of April, 1979.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on the

day

of

April, 1979, I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief
to each of the following attorneys, postage prepaid:
Lawrence R. Peterson, Jr.
Attorney for Respondent
2121 South State Street
Salt Lake City. Utah 84115
W. Robert Wright
Attorney for Templeton, Linke
& Associates, a Third-Party
Defendant
Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

